We provide a unified variational inequality framework for the study of fundamental properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games. We identify several conditions on the underlying network (in terms of spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix) that guarantee existence, uniqueness, convergence and continuity of equilibrium in general network games with multidimensional and possibly constrained strategy sets. We delineate the relations between these conditions and characterize classes of networks that satisfy each of these conditions.
Introduction
In many social and economic settings, decisions of individuals are affected by the actions of their friends, colleagues, and peers. Examples include adoption of new products and innovations, opinion formation and social learning, public good provision, financial exchanges and international trade. Network games have emerged as a powerful framework to study these settings with particular focus on how the underlying patterns of interactions, governed by a network, affect the economic outcome.
1 For tractability reasons, many of the works in this area studied games with special structure (e.g., quadratic cost functions, scalar non-negative strategies) or special properties (e.g., games of strategic complements or substitutes for which the best response of each agent is increasing or decreasing in the other agents strategies).
2 These works relied on disparate techniques for their analysis which then lead to different focal network properties for existence and uniqueness of equilibria. For example, papers on network games of strategic complements typically relate equilibrium properties to the spectral radius of the (weighted) adjacency matrix of the network (see e.g. Ballester et al. (2006) ; Jackson and Zenou (2014) ; Acemoglu et al. (2015) ) while papers considering network games of strategic substitutes highlight the role of the minimum eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix (see e.g. Bramoullé et al. (2014) ; Allouch (2015) ). Moreover, there has been relatively little work on network games that feature neither strategic complements nor substitutes and possibly involve multidimensional strategy sets (e.g., models where agents decide their effort level on more than one activity, Chen et al. (2018) ).
In this paper, we provide a unified framework based on a variational inequality reformulation of the Nash equilibrium to study equilibrium properties of network games including existence and uniqueness, convergence of the best response dynamics and comparative statics. Our framework extends the literature in multiple dimensions. It applies to games of strategic complements, substitutes as well as games with mixed strategic interactions. It provides a systematic understanding of which spectral properties of the network (spectral norm, minimum eigenvalue or infinity norm of the adjacency matrix) are relevant in establishing fundamental properties of the equilibrium. Moreover, it covers network games with multidimensional and constrained strategy sets.
Our work is built on the key observation that the analysis of network games can be performed in two steps. In the first step we focus on the operator of the variational inequality associated with the game, which is typically referred to as the game Jacobian and we derive sufficient conditions on the network and on the cost functions to guarantee that it possesses either one of three fundamental properties: strong monotonicity (which is a stronger version than the strict diagonal concavity condition used in Rosen (1965) ), uniform block P-function and uniform P-function.
3 Our sufficient conditions are formulated in terms of different network measures, i.e., spectral norm, infinity norm and minimum eigenvalue of the weighted adjacency matrix, as detailed in Assumptions 2a), 2b) and 2c). We highlight the relations between these conditions and we show that for symmetric networks, the condition in terms of the minimum eigenvalue is the least restrictive and hence is satisfied by the largest set of networks, whereas for asymmetric networks conditions in terms of spectral norm and infinity norm cannot be compared and are satisfied by different sets of networks. While the conditions that involve spectral norm and minimum eigenvalue have appeared in the study of special network games, the condition in terms of the infinity norm is new and arises naturally for games played over asymmetric networks where each agent is only influenced by a relatively small number of neighbors.
In the second step, we combine our sufficient conditions (connecting network properties to properties of the game Jacobian) with the theory of variational inequalities to derive equilibrium properties. A summary of our results is presented in Table 1 . Specifically, we extend previous literature results on existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium to games with multidimensional constrained strategy sets and mixed strategic effects, we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee convergence of continuous and discrete best response dynamics and finally we study how parameter variations affect the Nash equilibrium. Our first result in this context is to guarantee Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium under the block P-function property. 4 We then build on a sensitivity analysis result for variational inequalities applied to general games given in Facchinei and Pang (2010) ; Friesz and Bernstein (2016) to establish conditions under which the Nash equilibrium is differentiable and we derive an explicit formula for its sensitivity.
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To illustrate our theory we consider three running examples. First, we consider scalar linear quadratic network games for which the best response is a (truncated) linear function. These games have been extensively studied in the literature as illustrated in the seminal papers Ballester et al. (2006) , where a model featuring local complements and global substitutes is considered (mainly motivated by crime applications) and Bramoullé et al. (2014) , where games with mixed strategic effects are considered. The results in Bramoullé et al. (2014) are derived by using the approach of potential games, first introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996) . Expanding on Bramoullé et al. (2014) , we show that for scalar linear quadratic games the existence of a potential function is related to a condition on the symmetry of the network. When such condition is violated the potential approach suggested in Bramoullé et al. (2014) cannot be applied. The variational inequality approach presented in this work can be seen as an extension of the potential approach for cases when a potential function is not available. In fact, potential games whose potential function is strongly convex are a subclass of strongly monotone games. By leveraging on the theory of variational inequalities (instead of convex optimization) we show how the results in Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoullé et al. (2014) can be recovered and extended to linear quadratic models that are not potential.
3 While sufficient conditions for the former two properties in terms of the gradient of the game Jacobian have been studied in the literature (positive definiteness and the P Υ condition discussed in Scutari et al. (2014) , respectively), we here suggest a novel sufficient condition for the uniform P-function property (which we term uniform P-matrix condition). Our result extends the P-matrix condition used in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9(a) ) and is needed to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the solution of a variational inequality without imposing boundedness assumptions on its closed convex set.
4 This result extends (Dafermos, 1988 , Theorem 2.1) which holds under the more restrictive strong monotonicity condition. 5 Contrary to previous works, our formula for the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium depends on primal variables only. The only result of such type that we are aware of is (Dafermos, 1988, Theorem 3.1) . The formula therein is however obtained following geometric arguments and consequently depends on the orthogonal projection operator on the set of active constraints.
Assumption 2a Assumption 2b
Assumption 2c A main feature of linear quadratic games, that significantly simplifies their analysis, is the fact that the best response function is linear. A few works in the literature have extended the analysis of network games with scalar strategies to nonlinear settings by focusing on cases where the best response function is nonlinear but monotone. For example, considers a case where the best response function is increasing leading to a supermodular game. On the other hand, Allouch (2015) focuses on a model of public good games where the best response function is decreasing. Conditions for existence and uniqueness in both these cases have been derived using techniques tailored to the special structure of the problem. As second motivating example, we consider network games with scalar non-negative strategies where the best response is nonlinear and non-monotone, representing e.g. races and tournaments where agents work hardest when network externalities are small (neck and neck race) while they reduce their efforts if they fall behind (discouragement effect).
Finally, all the games mentioned above feature scalar strategies. As third motivating example, we consider a network game where each agent decides on how much effort to exert in more than one activity at the time. This model of multiple activities over networks was first suggested in Chen et al. (2018) and can be used to study agents engagement in activities that are interdependent such as crime and drug use (if activities are complements) or crime and education (if activities are substitutes). Chen et al. (2018) focuses on the particular case when the network effects within the same activity are complements and derives results on existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium by using a similar approach as in the single activity case studied in Ballester et al. (2006) . Our framework enables the study of cases where network effects within the same activity can be substitutes and interdependencies are present not only in the cost function but also in the strategy sets (e.g. because of budget constraints).
In addition to the papers cited above, our paper is most related to the seminal works of Harker and Pang (1990) ; Pang (2003, 2010) ; Scutari et al. (2014); Friesz and Bernstein (2016) and references therein. These works discuss the use of variational inequalities to analyze equilibria of general games. Our novel contribution is to focus on network games and unfold the effect of network properties on the game Jacobian and consequently on the equilibrium properties.
The only papers that we are aware of that study properties of the Nash equilibrium in network games by using variational inequalities are Ui (2016) , Melo (2018) and Naghizadeh and Liu (2017a) . All these works consider network games with scalar non-negative strategies. Specifically, Ui (2016) considers Bayesian network games with linear quadratic cost functions. Melo (2018) considers existence, uniqueness and comparative statics for scalar network games with symmetric unweighted networks, by focusing on strong monotonicity of the game Jacobian. For games with strategic substitutes, we show via a counterexample that strong monotonicity cannot be guaranteed under the minimum eigenvalue condition, not even for scalar network games with symmetric networks (see Example B.4). In fact our analysis suggests that for scalar games of strategic substitutes, the natural property is the uniform P-matrix condition. In addition to this substantial difference, our paper is distinct from Melo (2018) in the following ways: i) we do not consider only strong monotonicity but also uniform (block) P-functions, ii) we investigate how properties of the game Jacobian relate to network properties considering not only the minimum eigenvalue but also the spectral and infinity norm, iii) we consider networks that might be asymmetric and agents with possibly multidimensional strategy sets, iv) we consider games with mixed strategic effects for which the best response might not be monotone as a function of the neighbor aggregate, v) besides uniqueness and comparative statics, we also study convergence of best response dynamics. The recent paper Naghizadeh and Liu (2017a) focuses on a special case of scalar network games and derives conditions in terms of the absolute value of the elements of the adjacency matrix for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. This may be overly restrictive since taking the absolute value loses structural properties associated with games of strategic substitutes. Naghizadeh and Liu (2017b) studies public good network games by using linear complementarity problems (which are a subclass of variational inequalities). We remark that variational inequalities have been used to study specific network economic models such as spatial price equilibrium models, traffic networks, migration models and market equilibria, as reviewed for example in Nagurney (2013); Facchinei and Pang (2003) . In these settings however the network typically appears as part of the constraints and not in the cost function. Consequently, the network effects studied in this paper do not appear. Finally, Xu and Zhou (2017) uses variational inequality theory to study contest games whose cost function does not possess the aggregative structure considered in this paper (i.e. the cost depends on the strategies of the other agents individually and not on their aggregate).
It is also worth highlighting that network games have similarities with aggregative games. Equilibrium properties in aggregative games have been extensively studied in Novshek (1985) ; Kukushkin (1994); Jensen (2005) ; Acemoglu and Jensen (2013); Jensen (2010) ; Kukushkin (2004) ; Cornes and Hartley (2012) ; Dubey et al. (2006) . Moreover, motivated by technological applications such as demand-response energy markets or communication networks, several papers have studied distributed dynamics for convergence to the equilibria in aggregative games (see Chen et al. (2014) ; Koshal et al. (2012 Koshal et al. ( , 2016 ; Grammatico et al. (2016) ; Paccagnan et al. (2016) ). The main difference is that while in aggregative games each agent is affected by the same aggregate of the other agents strategies, in network games this aggregate is agent and network dependent.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the framework of network games and three motivational examples. In Section 3 we recall the connection between variational inequalities and game theory, we summarize properties that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the solution to a variational inequality and we present our technical results on the uniform P-matrix condition. Section 4 presents an overview of our results relating network and cost conditions to properties of the game Jacobian and illustrates these conditions for several networks of interest. Sections 5, 6 and 7 exploit the results of Section 4 to study existence and uniqueness, convergence of best response dynamics and comparative statics, respectively. Section 8 concludes the paper. Some basic matrix properties and lemmas used in the main text are summarized in Appendix A. Appendix B provides the technical statements of the results anticipated in Section 4 and Appendix C their proofs. Appendix D proves our technical result on the uniform P-matrix condition. Appendices E and F expand on Sections 6 and 7, respectively. Definitions, examples and technical statements provided in the appendices are labeled with the corresponding letter.
Notation:
We denote the gradient of a function f (x) :
the set of integer numbers in the interval [a, b] . I n denotes the n-dimensional identity matrix, 1 n the vector of unit entries and e i the ith canonical vector. Given A ∈ R n×n , A 0 ( 0) ⇔ x Ax > 0 (≥ 0), ∀x = 0, A (k,:) denotes the kth row of A, ρ(A) denotes the spectral radius of A and Λ(A) the spectrum. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product and
is the block diagonal matrix whose ith block is
Note that x i is the ith block component of x. We instead denote by [x] h , for h ∈ N[1, N n], the h-th scalar element of x. The symbols ≥ e and ≤ e denote element-wise ordering relations for vectors. ∂X is the boundary of the set X . Π Q X (x) denotes the projection of the vector x in the closed and convex set X according to the weighted norm · Q ; Π X (x) := Π I X (x). For the definition of vector and matrix norms see Appendix A.
Our approach relies on the theory of variational inequalities as defined next.
Definition 1 (Variational Inequality (VI)). A vectorx ∈ R d solves the variational inequality VI(X , F ) with set X ⊆ R d and operator F : X → R d if and only if
In the following we consider the VI with set
obtained as the cartesian product of the local strategy sets X i and operator F : X → R N n whose i-th block component F i (x) is the gradient of the cost function of agent i with respect to its own strategy, i.e.,
This operator is sometimes referred to as the game Jacobian. The relevance of this VI in characterizing Nash equilibria of general games (i.e., not necessarily network games) comes from the following well-known relation, see e.g. (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 1.4 .2).
Proposition 1 (VI reformulation). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. A vector of strategies x is a Nash equilibrium for the game G if and only if it solves the VI(X , F ) with X as in (9) and F as in (10).
Proposition 1 can be seen as a generalization of potential games as introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996) . In fact, it follows from (Monderer and Shapley, 1996, Lemma 4.4 ) that a game is potential with potential function U (x) if and only if ∇ x U (x) = F (x). In other words, a game has an exact potential if and only if the game Jacobian F (x) is integrable. In such case, by the minimum principle, the VI condition given in (8) coincides with the necessary optimality conditions for the optimization problem min x∈X U (x), whose stationary points are the Nash equilibria of the game, see e.g. , Lemma 1). The VI approach enables the analysis of games that are not potential (i.e. games for which F (x) is not integrable). Specifically, Proposition 1 allows one to analyze the Nash equilibria in terms of properties of the game Jacobian F and of the set X . To this end, we recall the following definitions.
b) A uniform block P-function with respect to the partition
for all x, y ∈ X .
The properties in the previous definition are stated in decreasing order of strength, as illustrated in the first line of Figure 2 . 10 We note that in the case of potential games strong monotonicity of F (x) is equivalent to strong convexity of the potential function U (x). For general games (i.e., not necessarily potential games), such condition is a slightly stronger version of the diagonal strict concavity condition used in the seminal work of Rosen (1965) (see more details in Appendix A). The reason why we focus on strong monotonicity in this work is that it allows us to prove existence of the Nash equilibrium without assuming compactness, as instead assumed in Rosen (1965) . Our interest in the properties listed in Definition 2 stems from the following classical result for existence and uniqueness of the solution of a VI, see e.g. (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Theorem 2.3.3(b) and Proposition 3.5.10(b)).
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Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness for VIs). Consider the VI(X , F ) where F is continuous and X is nonempty, closed and convex. The VI(X , F ) admits a unique solution under any of the following statements: a) F is strongly monotone.
b) The set X is a cartesian product X 1 × . . . × X N and F is a uniform block P-function with respect to the same partition.
c) The set X is a rectangle and F is a uniform P-function.
Note that the stronger the condition on F is, the weaker the requirement on the set X is. Proposition 2 together with Proposition 1 allows one to derive sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in terms of properties of the game Jacobian and of the constraint sets. Our main contribution in Section 4 is to derive sufficient conditions that guarantee that the game Jacobian of a network game has one of the properties listed in Definition 2, by imposing conditions on the cost functions of the players and on the spectral properties of the network. To this end, we exploit sufficient conditions for the properties in Definition 2 to hold in terms of the gradient ∇ x F (x) as detailed in the next subsection.
Sufficient conditions in terms of
We start by introducing the definitions of P-matrices, P Υ condition and uniform P-matrix condition.
Definition 3 (P-matrix). (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3. 3) A matrix A ∈ R d×d is a P-matrix if all its principal minors have positive determinant. Equivalently, A is a P-matrix if and only if for any w ∈ R d , w = 0 there exists a diagonal matrix H w 0 such that w H w Aw > 0.
A special class of P-matrices are positive definite matrices. In fact, if a matrix A is positive definite then Definition 3 holds with H w = I. The opposite holds true if the matrix A is symmetric.
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The sufficient conditions detailed in the following Proposition 3 amount to ensuring that ∇ x F (x), which is a matrix valued function, possesses suitable properties "uniformly" in x. For example, strong monotonicity of F (x) can be guaranteed if the gradient ∇ x F (x) is uniformly positive definite. Similarly, to guarantee that F (x) is a uniform P-function we show that it is sufficient to assume that ∇ x F (x) satisfies what we term a "uniform P-matrix condition" which is given in full generality in Definition D.1 in the appendix. We here report the corresponding definition for the affine case F (x) = Ax + a. Intuitively, this corresponds to assuming that ∇ x F (x) is a "uniform" P-matrix for all values of x.
Definition 4 (Uniform P-matrix condition -affine case). Consider an operator F (x) = Ax+a where
satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition if and only if there exists η > 0 such that for any w ∈ R d there exists a diagonal matrix H w 0 such that w H w Aw ≥ η w 2 and max w λ max (H w ) < ∞.
The condition above is formulated in terms of the full matrix ∇ x F (x) which, in the case of agents with multidimensional strategies, has dimension N n × N n. The P Υ condition introduced next is instead used to summarize the effect that each pair of agents has on one another with a scalar number. In fact the condition in Definition 5 relates the properties of a matrix A(x) ∈ R N n×N n with N blocks each of dimension 11 Statement c) is a consequence of statement b). In fact if X is a rectangle then it can be partitioned as X = X 1 × . . . × X N n with X h ⊆ R for all h ∈ N[1, N n] and if F is a uniform P-function then it is a uniform block P-function with respect to a block partition with blocks of dimension one. We here write this condition separately to avoid any confusion with the block partition X = X 1 × . . . × X N induced by the N players.
12 It is shown in (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3. 3) that if A is a P -matrix then all its real eigenvalues are positive. If A is symmetric all its eigenvalues are real. These two properties imply that A is positive definite.
n with the properties of a smaller matrix Υ ∈ R N ×N , where the effect of each block is summarized with a scalar number κ i,j (independent of x). Specifically, let A i,j (x) ∈ R n×n be the block in position (i, j).
N ×N is constructed as follows.
0, κ i,j < ∞ for all i, j and Υ in (11) is a P-matrix.
The following proposition relates the previous conditions to the properties in Definition 2.
Proposition 3 (Sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity and (block) P-functions). If the operator F is continuously differentiable and the set X is nonempty, closed and convex, the following holds. a) F is strongly monotone if and only if there exists α > 0 such that F is strongly monotone ⇒ F is a uniform block P-function ⇒ F is a uniform P-function
αI P Υ condition as by Def. 5 P-matrix condition as by Def. D.1 It is important to stress that while both strong monotonicity and the P Υ condition are sufficient to guarantee that F is a uniform block P-function (and hence uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium), there is in general no relation between the two. In fact there are strongly monotone functions whose gradient does not satisfy the P Υ condition (see Example B.3) and there are functions whose gradient satisfies the P Υ condition but are not strongly monotone (see Example B.1). Besides existence and uniqueness, we show in Section 6 that the P Υ condition guarantees convergence of the best response dynamics, while we show in Section 7 that strong monotonicity is useful for sensitivity analysis. Finally, we employ the uniform P-function condition for the analysis of scalar games of strategic substitutes. Consequently, it is important to understand conditions under which each of the properties in Figure 2 is satisfied.
Properties of the game Jacobian in network games
Our goal in this section is to find sufficient conditions in terms of the influence of agent i on its marginal cost (i.e., ∇
, the influence of the neighbor aggregate on the cost of agent i (i.e., ∇
) and the network G to guarantee that the game Jacobian F (x) posses the properties detailed in Definition 2.
To this end, we exploit the sufficient conditions on ∇ x F (x) detailed in Proposition 3. In the case of network games, ∇ x F (x) can be rewritten as
where W := G ⊗ I n and
Note that by the properties of the Hessian,
With this notation it is clear that for network games the quantities in Definition 5 can be rewritten as
The next example provides some intuition.
Example 1 (Continued). Consider Example 1 with a i = 0 for simplicity. According to Proposition 1 a vector x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it solves the VI(X , F ) where
To get an intuition on the role of the quantities introduced in (14) in our subsequent analysis, let us consider the strongly monotone case. By Proposition 3a, to prove strong monotonicity of F one needs to show that
is positive definite for all x. By using the gradient structure highlighted in (12) it is immediate to see that for network games
Consequently, the positive definiteness of
can be guaranteed by bounding the minimum eigenvalue of the sum of the two matrices on the right hand side of (15). It is clear that such a bound should depend on κ 1 = min x λ min (D(x)), κ 2 = max x K(x) 2 as defined in (14) and on the properties of G, since W = G ⊗ I n . This approach motivates us to study conditions of the form
where w(G) is a scalar that captures the network effect. Condition (16) can be understood as a bound on how large can the effect of the neighbor aggregate (measured by κ 2 ) be on an agent payoff with respect to the effect of its own action (measured by κ 1 ) where w(G) is a weight that scales the magnitude of the two effects. In the following, we consider three different network measures, as detailed next.
Assumption 2 (Sufficient conditions in terms of κ 1 , κ 2 and G). Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds:
Assumption 2a and 2c allows us to recover and extend conditions derived in the literature for special instances of network games by using a different type of analysis. Assumption 2b is new to our knowledge and provides a natural summary of the network effect since G ∞ corresponds to the maximum row sum of G and is thus a measure of the maximum aggregate influence that the neighbors have on each agent.
Our main technical result in this paper is to show that each of the three conditions in Assumption 2 guarantees a different set of properties of the game Jacobian, as summarized in Table 2 .
Assumption 2a Assumption 2b
Assumption 2c
Unif. P-function The technical statements are provided in Appendix B. In all cases we suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For negative cases we provide a counter-example in Appendix B. We list the P Υ condition instead of the block P-function property because we show in Section 6 that the former is required for convergence of the discrete best response dynamics. Note that Assumptions 2c alone does not guarantee any property, in fact multiple Nash equilibria may arise (see Ex. B.2).
Before providing some intuitions on the results of Table 2 , we outline the relation between the conditions in Assumption 2 and delineate which classes of networks satisfy each one of them. Table 2 shows that Assumption 2a guarantees both strong monotonicity and the P Υ condition. However, depending on the network, this assumption might be restrictive. To see this, note that the larger the value of G 2 is, the more restrictive Assumption 2a becomes. Figure 3 shows that for some representative networks such as the complete network (Figure 3a ) or the asymmetric star (Figure 3d ), G 2 might actually grow unbounded in the number of players N . This means that, for such networks, Assumption 2a may not hold as the number of agents grows. We argue in the next subsections that Assumption 2b and 2c may be used as alternative conditions in these cases by showing that for symmetric networks Assumption 2c holds for a broader range of networks, while for asymmetric networks Assumption 2a and 2b allow addressing different set of networks.
Some comments on Assumption 2

Symmetric networks
Asymmetric networks 
We use the convention that G ij corresponds to an arrow from j to i, since G ij > 0 means that agent i is affected by the strategy of agent j. For example in the network d), all the agents are affected by the strategy of the agent in the top left corner and he is not affected by any other agent. In all the networks above, we use unitary edge weight. Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). Consequently, we get G 2 = ρ(G) ≤ G ∞ . This shows that whenever G is symmetric Assumption 2b is more restrictive than Assumption 2a. Hence Assumption 2b is a viable alternative to Assumption 2a only for asymmetric networks. For asymmetric networks, there is no relation between G 2 and G ∞ , i.e., there are networks for which G 2 < G ∞ and networks for which G ∞ < G 2 . Figures 3c) and 3d) show some examples of the latter case, thus justifying our interest for Assumption 2b. Note for example that for the asymmetric star network, we have G 2 = √ N − 1 while G ∞ = 1 independently of N , thus Assumption 2b can hold for large number of players while Assumption 2a does not. More generally, we note that, for the case of regular networks where each agent has the same number d of in-neighbors, one gets immediately that
Relation between
Hence for asymmetric regular networks Assumption 2b is a relaxation of Assumption 2a. Figure 3c) shows an example where the inequality is strict. 
Relation between G 2 and |λ min (G)|
If the network is symmetric, then all the eigenvalues of G are real and λ min (G) is well defined. In this case, we have already mentioned that G 2 ≤ G ∞ . The relation between G 2 and λ min (G) is detailed in the next lemma. Lemma 1. Suppose that G = G is a non-zero and non-negative matrix entry-wise with zero diagonal.
Proof. Since G is non-negative, it follows from Perron-Frobenius theorem that
In other words, Lemma 1 proves that if G is symmetric Assumption 2c is less restrictive than Assumption 2a. Figure 3 shows networks where this is strictly the case. Note for example that for the complete network in Figure 3a ) we have G 2 = N − 1 while λ min (G) = −1 independently of N , thus Assumption 2c can hold for large number of players while Assumption 2a does not. We stress that there are graphs of interest for which |λ min (G)| = G 2 . Some examples are the undirected ring with an even number of nodes or any bipartite graph (see Figure 3b ). For these cases, Assumption 2c and Assumption 2a coincide. For general d-regular graphs, it is known that |λ min (G)| = G 2 if and only if G is bipartite. The gap between |λ min (G)| and G 2 when G is not bipartite is studied e.g. in Desai and Rao (1994) . Figure 4 shows a summary of the relations between the three assumptions for asymmetric and symmetric networks. Table 2 The technical statements relative to the results in Table 2 and their proofs are provided in Appendices B and C. We here provide an overview and some intuition on these results.
Some intuitions on the results in
Strong monotonicity
According to Proposition 3a, F (x) is strongly monotone if and only if ∇ x F (x) is uniformly positive definite. We have already mentioned at the beginning of this section -see Eq. (15) -that such a condition can be guaranteed by lower bounding the smallest eigenvalue of the Jordan product
. In Theorem B.1a) we show that for any matrix K(x) and W it holds
This immediately implies that strong monotonicity holds under Assumption 2a.
We show in Example B.1 that instead Assumption 2b does not guarantee strong monotonicity. A loose intuition can be provided by noting that when n = 1 by Gershgorin theorem,
When G is asymmetric, Assumption 2b provides a bound on G ∞ but it does not impose any assumption on G 1 . When G is symmetric, we recall that Assumption 2a is less strict than Assumption 2b. Finally, Assumption 2c can be used to guarantee strong monotonicity if additionally G = G and
In this case, we show in Theorem B.3 that the lower bound in (17) can be further improved to
To illustrate this case, consider the scalar linear quadratic game in Example 1, so that K(x) = K ∈ R N ×N . If the weights K i are homogeneous and positive, then K(x) is a scalar positive matrix, that is, K(x) = κ 2 I N . Using this fact and the symmetry of the network it is immediate to see that
The two assumptions that the game features strategic substitutes (i.e. K i > 0) and the weights K i are homogeneous (i.e. K i = κ 2 ∀i) are critical in this argument. In the case of complements one would instead get K(x) = −κ 2 I N and the negative sign would imply λ min (−κ 2 G) = −κ 2 λ max (G) = −κ 2 G 2 leading back to the more restrictive Assumption 2a. Instead, when the weights are heterogeneous, K is a positive diagonal matrix with different diagonal elements and it might happen that
as illustrated in Example B.4. If this happens, Assumption 2c is not sufficient to guarantee strong monotonicity, even in the case of scalar games of strategic substitutes. We show instead that in this case Assumption 2c guarantees that the game Jacobian satisfies the weaker uniform P-function property.
P Υ condition
The main advantage of the P Υ condition is that it is expressed on the reduced matrix Υ, which has size N × N , instead of the gradient ∇ x F (x), which has size N n × N n. This dimension reduction is achieved by summarizing the matrix of cross agents interactions with a single scalar number
This operation loses the sign properties of K i (x). Consequently, any distinction between game of strategic complements or substitutes is lost in the Υ matrix. To clarify this, consider again the linear quadratic game in Example 1 with K i = −δ for all i (recall that this is a game of strategic complements if δ > 0 and substitutes if δ < 0). In both cases Υ = I − |δ|G. This is the fundamental reason why Assumption 2c, which is typical of games of strategic substitutes, cannot be used to ensure the P Υ condition. The fact that instead Assumption 2a and 2b are both sufficient is proven in Theorems B.1 and B.2 by showing that, under these assumptions, the matrix M := κ 1 I − κ 2 G is a P-matrix. The conclusion then follows from the fact that Υ is a Z-matrix and is element-wise greater than M .
Uniform P-function
The previous two subsections highlight that under Assumption 2a and 2b, the game Jacobian is either strongly monotone or it satisfies the P Υ condition (which are stronger properties than the uniform P-function property discussed here). Assumption 2c is instead sufficient to prove strong monotonicity if the network weights K i (x) are homogeneous and positive definite. With heterogeneous weights, we focus on the special class of scalar games of strategic substitutes (i.e. n = 1, K i (x) ≥ ν > 0). In this case, even though the game Jacobian might not be strongly monotone (see Example B.4), we show in Theorem B.4 that it is a uniform P-function. Understanding whether any of the properties in Definition 2 holds under Assumption 2c when n > 1 and the weights are heterogeneous is an open problem.
Existence and uniqueness
This section uses the properties established in Table 2 , together with Propositions 1 and 2, to present existence and uniqueness results for the Nash equilibrium of special classes of network games. We organize our discussion by first focusing on linear quadratic (multidimensional) network games, whereby we also explain how our theory recovers and extends existing results, and then we discuss the less explored class of nonlinear network games.
Linear quadratic network games
We start by considering linear quadratic games with general convex closed strategy sets X i ⊆ R n and cost function
where
are both independent of x. The results of Table 2 immediately yield the following two corollaries; the first one for general linear quadratic games (using Theorem B.1 and B.2) and the second for linear quadratic games of strategic substitutes (using Theorems B.3 and B.4).
Corollary 1 (Linear quadratic games). Consider a linear quadratic game with cost functions as in (18).
Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds:
Then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Condition (LQ 2 ) guarantees that Assumption 2a is met. By Theorem B.1 the game Jacobian is strongly monotone and the statement follows from Propositions 1 and 2a). Condition (LQ ∞ ) guarantees that Assumption 2b is met. By Theorem B.2 the game Jacobian satisfies the P Υ condition and the statement follows from Propositions 1 and 2b).
We note that Condition (LQ 2 ) guarantees that the sufficient condition derived in Ui (2016) holds. 13 The second corollary focuses on G = G and provides alternative sufficient conditions in terms of |λ min (G)| for games of strategic substitutes (recall that for symmetric networks it holds |λ min (G)| ≤ G 2 ≤ G ∞ ).
13 For general games, Proposition 1 in Ui (2016) states that if F (x) is strictly monotone then there exists at most one Nash equilibrium. For linear quadratic network games Proposition 4 therein states that if Q + KG 0 then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Using this condition Ui (2016) shows that one can recover the results in Ballester et al. (2006) and Bramoullé et al. (2014) , among others. We note that Condition (LQ 2 ) in this work is a sufficient condition for Q + KG 0. On the other hand, Condition (LQ∞) does not imply Q + KG 0 and thus allows the study of linear quadratic network games that do not satisfy the condition in Ui (2016) .
Corollary 2 (Linear quadratic games of strategic substitutes). Consider a linear quadratic game with cost functions as in (18). Suppose that G = G and that one of the following conditions holds:
1. Scalar games of strategic substitutes: n = 1, K i > 0 ∀i.
Homogeneous weights:
Then the condition min
guarantees existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Condition (LQ min ) guarantees that Assumption 2c holds. Under condition 1), X is rectangular since n = 1 and Theorem B.4 guarantees that F is a uniform P-function (note that ν := min i K i > 0). Under condition 2), Theorem B.3 guarantees that F is strongly monotone. In both cases existence and uniqueness then follow by Propositions 1 and 2.
To place our results in the context of the existing literature, we revise the network game with multiple activities described in Example 3, which subsumes the models studied in Ballester et al. (2006) ; Bramoullé and Kranton (2007) ; Bramoullé et al. (2014) ; Chen et al. (2018) and introduces new features such as budget constraints that have not been considered before.
Example 3 (Continued). Consider the network game described in Example 3 and note that the payoff of each agent corresponds to a cost function as in (18) with
Corollary 1 provides the following sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
Condition (19) reduces to Assumptions 1 and 4 in Chen et al. (2018) for the sub-cases considered therein where Chen et al. (2018) is equivalent to (19) if the signs of µ and β i follow the relation detailed in Footnote 9. We also note that both Conditions (19) and (20) do not require δ to be positive, apply to possibly asymmetric networks and can be used for any closed and convex set X i (e.g., representing budget constraints). For the case when δ is negative and G is symmetric a more expansive condition can be obtained by using Corollary 2-2. In fact, in this model
If δ < 0 the elements on the diagonal ofK are positive and if |µ| < |δ| then det(K) = δ 2 − µ 2 > 0 implying thatK 0. From Corollary 2-2 a sufficient condition for uniqueness is thus
which can be seen as a generalization of the results in Bramoullé et al. (2014) to network games with multiple activities where network effects within the same activity are substitutes.
To better illustrate the relation between our conditions and the ones derived in previous works we consider the case β i = β for all agents i, µ = 0, G = G and no budget constraint so that Bramoullé et al. (2014) Multiple activities 
there is no coupling between the activities and hence the equilibria of this model are the same as the equilibria of the single activity model described in Example 1. Table 3 shows that conditions (19) and (21) recover to the well-known conditions in Ballester et al. (2006) , Bramoullé et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2018) for the cases studied therein. A novel condition is obtained for games that feature strategic substitutability within the same activity.
Condition (20) is new. To illustrate its utility, recall from the analysis in Section 4.1.1 that this condition may handle cases not covered by Condition (19) when the network is asymmetric. An example that illustrates this additional flexibility is a game with single activity (β = 0) and strategic complements (δ > 0) where there is an agent which is a trend setter in the sense that its decision influences the rest of the agents much more than any other agent, as in the network illustrated in Figure 5 . For this network G 2 = 1.7437 while G ∞ = 1.2. Hence by using the condition of Ballester et al. (2006) one can guarantee uniqueness for δ < 0.5735 while by using the new Condition (20), uniqueness is guaranteed for the larger interval δ < 0.8333.
Nonlinear network games
We next consider network games with nonlinear cost functions of the form
where f i , q i are differentiable functions and
are uniformly strongly convex with constant κ 1 > 0. Note that for games with this structure κ 2 = max i max z i ∇ z i f i (z i ) . We use the results in Table 2 to obtain the following corollaries for this class of games.
Corollary 3 (Nonlinear network games). Consider a nonlinear network game with cost functions as in (22) . Suppose that at least one of the following conditions holds
Proof. Under (NL 2 ) Assumption 2a is met. The result follows from Theorem B.1 and Propositions 1 and 2a). Under (NL ∞ ) Assumption 2b is met. The result follows from Theorem B.2 and Propositions 1 and 2b).
Corollary 3 under (NL ∞ ) generalizes the result in Acemoglu et al. (2015) (obtained for the case n = 1,
where f is a contraction mapping, and the network G is such that j =i G ij = 1) to games with generic heterogeneous interaction functions f i and multidimensional strategies. If we consider games of strategic substitutes we instead obtain the following.
Corollary 4 (Nonlinear network games of strategic substitutes). Consider a network game with cost function as in (22) . Suppose that G = G , n = 1 and that at least one of the following holds
Then the condition
Proof. Under condition 1. the conclusion follows from Theorem B.4 and Propositions 1 and 2c). Under condition 2. Theorem B.4 guarantees that F (x) is a P-function (see Definition A.1). Since this is a scalar game of strategic substitutes the best response function of each agent is non-increasing in z i . Let a i be the lower bound on X i and z
Equivalently, the best response takes values in the compact interval [a i , b i ]. The conclusion then follows from the fact that a Nash equilibrium exists by Brower fixed point theorem and there is at most one equilibrium since F (x) is a P-function, see (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5 .10 (a)).
Note that Corollary 4 applies only to scalar games. Nonetheless, it slightly extends the result in Allouch (2015) by allowing for more general interaction functions.
14 To illustrate the results in Corollary 3 and 4 we consider Example 2 which nests the models discussed in and Allouch (2015) .
Example 2 (Continued). The best response discussed in Example 2 corresponds to a network game where each agent has cost function
By Corollary 3 and Corollary 4 existence and uniqueness can thus
Let us consider again the special case with
, for all i and network G such that j G ij = 1. Recall that the parameter γ > 0 models the level of network effects. For this particular choice of φ i (z i ) and G, it turns out that κ 2 = γ max z∈ [a,b] |b − 2z| = γb and G 2 ≥ G ∞ = 1. Hence (NL ∞ ) guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium for γ < 1 b . To further understand the equilibrium structure we start by considering symmetric equilibria. Suppose
symmetric equilibrium if and only if φ(x γ ) =x γ − a. The plot on the left of Figure 6 shows that such equation admits a solutionx γ ∈ (a, b) for any γ > 0. Hence for any level of network effects there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all the agents exert the same effort. From the uniqueness result above we know that for small levels of network effects (i.e. γ < 1 b ), this is the unique Nash equilibrium. shows that if φ i > 0 (i.e. the games features strategic complements) and satisfies some curvature conditions (e.g. φ i is concave) then the Nash equilibrium is unique, no matter the level of 14 The setup of Allouch (2015) coincides with the choice q i (
, where γ i is consumers i's Engel curve and w i > 0 is his income. The network normality condition therein (i.e., 1 +
> (f i ) (·) > 0, which implies that this is a game of strategic substitutes (i.e., (f i ) (·) > 0) and that Assumption 2c is satisfied (i.e., 1 − max
network effects. We next show that when the best response is instead non-monotone, for large values of γ, multiple equilibria may arise. To exemplify this point we consider a case with N = 2 players, G = G c and we set a = 1, b = 5. The equilibria of this game are shown in Figure 6 (right). For γ < 0.4866 there is a unique equilibrium which is symmetric (x 1 S = x 2 S , black line). This is consistent with our theory that guarantees a unique equilibrium for γ < a, b) or viceversa. Overall, we can conclude that when network effects are small the result of competition is to have two agents that are both equally engaged, if network effects are high there is instead the possibility of specialization with one agent clearly dominating over the other. This result is qualitatively similar to Proposition 3 in Bramoullé et al. (2014) , where it was shown that, for the game of strategic substitutes considered therein, for large network effects there exists at least one Nash equilibrium with inactive agents. 
Best response dynamics
After characterizing the set of Nash equilibria, we here discuss how agents can reach such a configuration by iteratively playing their best responses. In accordance with the previous literature we consider both continuous and discrete best response dynamics (BR dynamics). For continuous time we consider the scheme introduced in Bramoullé et al. (2014) and reported in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Continuous best response dynamics
Set:
For the case of discrete dynamics, we index by k ∈ N the time instants at which at least one agent is updating its strategy. For each i ∈ N[1, N ], we denote by T i ⊆ N the subset of time instants at which agent i updates its strategy. In Algorithm 2 we consider two variants of the discrete BR dynamics depending on whether the agents update their strategies simultaneously or sequentially, which correspond to T i = N and T i = N (N − 1) + i, respectively.
Algorithm 2 Discrete best response dynamics
Iterate:
This type of dynamics have been used in the literature to refine the set of Nash equilibria by focusing on those that are asymptotically stable for the continuous/discrete BR dynamics.
16 Intuitively, this means that following a small change of the strategies the agents can converge back to equilibrium by simply following their continuous/discrete BR dynamics.
It is well known that if the game has a strongly convex potential then the continuous BR dynamics (as well as the sequential discrete BR dynamics) globally converge to the unique Nash equilibrium, see Lemma E.2. The intuition behind this result is simple: since each strategy update leads to a decrease of the potential function, the BR dynamics must converge to the unique minimum of such potential which is the unique Nash equilibrium. From (Monderer and Shapley, 1996 , Lemma 4.4) it follows that a game is potential if and only if there exists U (x) such that ∇ x U (x) = F (x). It is then easy to see that such potential U (x) is strongly convex if and only if F (x) is strongly monotone. In other words, strongly convex potential games are a subclass of strongly monotone games. This motivates the question of whether the preceding convergence results can be generalized to strongly monotone games that are not potential.
The answer to this question depends on the type of dynamics considered (continuous vs discrete). For continuous BR dynamics note that, in a potential game, U (x) acts as a Lyapunov function (Sandholm, 2010, Section 7.1 
.1). In fact let B(x) be the vector of best responses to the strategy vector x (i.e. [B(x)]
and it follows by the definition of best response (see Lemma E.1) that for any x ∈ X
In other words, d(x) is a descent direction for the potential function U (x). If the game is not potential then F (x) cannot be seen as a gradient of any function. Hence while (23) still holds, the interpretation of d(x) as a descent direction is lost. In the following theorem we show that, however, if F (x) is strongly monotone and the cost function has the following form
for Q i = (Q i ) 0 and f i : R n → R n , then a similar argument can be made by using the Lyapunov functioñ
. The reason why we consider cost functions as in (24) is that, in this case, the best response mapping solves a quadratic program in x i and can thus be rewritten as a projection step, that is,
as shown in Lemma E.3. We note that the cost structure in (24) is general enough to include all our motivating Examples 1 to 3. Formula (26) allows us to show that d(x) is a descent direction forŨ (x).
Lemma 2. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with agent cost functions as in (24). Suppose that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant α then
2 .
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is the convergence of the continuous BR dynamics under strong monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with agent cost functions as in (24). Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then for any x 0 ∈ X the sequence {x(t)} t≥0 generated by Algorithm 1 converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of G.
It is important to remark thatŨ (x) as defined in (25) is a Lyapunov function sinceŨ (x) decreases along the continuous trajectory x(t), but it is not a potential for the game as defined in Monderer and Shapley (1996) . For this reason, strong monotonicity is not sufficient to guarantee convergence of the discrete BR dynamics. To see this, note that, when the cost function is as in (24), the discrete BR dynamics coincide, by (26), with the projection algorithm
for the step choice τ = 1. If F is strongly monotone the projection algorithm converges when τ is small but not necessarily for τ = 1, see e.g. Facchinei and Pang (2003) . A counter-example, illustrating that strong monotonicity alone (without the potential structure) is not sufficient to guarantee convergence of the discrete BR dynamics (either simultaneous or sequential) is given in Example E.1. Interestingly, Example E.1 shows that strong monotonicity is not enough to guarantee convergence of the discrete simultaneous BR dynamics even when the game is potential. The reason is that while in sequential BR dynamics one can guarantee that each step decreases the potential, in the case of simultaneous moves this is no longer true. In (Scutari et al., 2014, Theorem 10) it is shown that convergence of the discrete simultaneous BR dynamics can instead be guaranteed by using the P Υ property. The reason why this result holds is fundamentally different from the argument used in potential games. In fact it is not based on the existence of a Lyapunov function, but convergence is instead guaranteed by showing that the best response mapping is a block-contraction, as recalled in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. (Scutari et al., 2014 , Proposition 42) Consider a game for which ∇ x F (x) satisfies the P Υ condition, then the best response mapping B(x) is a block-contraction, that is, there exist c ∈ R N >0 and 0 < δ c < 1 such that
The P Υ condition can be used to prove convergence of any of the algorithms above, as detailed next.
Theorem 2. Consider a network game satisfying Assumption 1 and suppose that ∇ x F (x) satisfies the P Υ condition. Then for any x 0 ∈ X the sequence {x(t)} t≥0 generated by Algorithm 1 and the sequence {x k } ∞ k=0 generated by Algorithm 2 converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of G.
We note that convergence of the discrete BR dynamics follows immediately from (Scutari et al., 2014, Theorem 10) where convergence is proven for general games (i.e. not necessarily network games) and for both simultaneous and sequential updates (in fact, also random updates with delays can be considered, see Algorithm 1 therein). The result on convergence of the continuous BR dynamics under the P Υ condition is instead new.
It is important to stress that the block contraction property used in Theorem 2 to prove convergence of the discrete BR dyanmics does not necessarily hold under strong monotonicity (see Example E.2). A number of alternative discrete time algorithms have been suggested in the literature to guarantee convergence to the Nash equilibrium when the game Jacobian is strongly monotone. These schemes typically depend on some tuning parameters and are meant for applications where there is flexibility in tuning the algorithm or the update of the agents. For this reason, we do not discuss these algorithms here and we instead refer the interested reader to Chen et al. (2014) ; Koshal et al. (2012 Koshal et al. ( , 2016 where the use of distributed projection algorithms is discussed, to Scutari et al. (2014) where a regularized version of the best response dynamics is presented and to Parise et al. (2015a,b) where convergence of the best response dynamics for strongly monotone linear quadratic network games is achieved by assuming that the agents respond to a filtered version of the neighbor aggregate. Note that Theorems B.1 and B.3 in this work give sufficient conditions in terms of the network to guarantee strong monotonicity and thus convergence of such schemes.
A summary of the results discussed so far in this section is provided in the following table.
Potential game Strongly monotone P Υ condition Continuous BR dynamics Algorithm 1 (Sandholm (2010) ) ( if cost as in (24) By combining Table 4 with the results in Table 2 one immediately gets that if either Assumption 2a) or Assumption 2b) hold then the P Υ condition is met (by Theorems B.1 and B.2) and both Algorithms 1 and 2 converge by Theorem 2. For games of strategic substitutes with symmetric networks, one can consider also Assumption 2c). Theorems 1 and B.3 guarantee that, if the cost function is as in (24) and K i (x) =K(x) 0 ∀i, then the continuous BR dynamics (Algorithm 1) converge but Example E.1A) shows that the discrete BR dynamics (Algorithm 2) may not. The only case of Table 2 which is not covered by the previous theory is the case when n = 1 and K i (x) > 0. In this case F is a P-function hence none of the previous conditions apply. We next show that nonetheless it is possible to prove convergence of the continuous BR dynamics. Example E.1A) instead shows that the discrete BR dynamics might not converge.
Theorem 3. Consider a scalar network game satisfying Assumption 1 and with cost function as in (24) with
Assume that G = G and that ∇ x F (x ) is a P-matrix. Moreover, suppose that the equilibrium is non degenerate, that is, if
17 Then x is locally asymptotically stable for the continuous BR dynamics given in Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3 generalizes (Allouch, 2015, Theorem 2) . A summary of the results on BR dynamics for network games under Assumption 2a), 2b) and 2c) is given in Table 1 in the introduction. To illustrate our findings we apply the previous theory to the multiple activities model considered in Example 3.
Example 3 (Continued). We divide our analysis in two cases.
If either condition (19) or (20) hold, then ∇ x F (x) satisfies the P Υ condition and Theorem 2 allows us to conclude that the unique Nash equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable for both Algorithm 1 and 2 (i.e. both continuous and discrete BR dynamics globally converge). Recall that this model includes as special cases the games studied in Chen et al. (2018) (for δ > 0) and Ballester et al. (2006) (for β = 0). Our result proves convergence of the continuous and discrete BR dynamics in both these models.
17 Note that the assumption Q i = 1 is without loss of generality because in the scalar case Q i is a positive number, hence one can always consider an equivalent game with cost functionsJ i (x) =
Q i . The assumption that ∇xF (x ) is a P-matrix is weaker than the assumption that F satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition and is guaranteed under the assumptions of Theorem B.4. Finally, the assumption that the equilibrium is non degenerate corresponds to the assumption that the strict complementarity condition holds, see Assumption 5c) and Appendix F for a related discussion. If δ < 0, then condition (21) guarantees that F (x) is strongly monotone. Theorem 1 allows us to conclude global convergence of the continuous BR dynamics. This result is in line with the findings of , Corollary 2) obtained for games with scalar strategies.
Comparative statics
We finally study how the Nash equilibrium changes when the cost functions of the agents or the network changes. To this end, we introduce the parametric cost functions
to be the set of all possible parameters. We denote by G(y, G) the game with parameter y ∈ Y and network G. The corresponding parametric game Jacobian is
We generalize Assumption 1 as follows.
Assumption 3 (Parametric games). The set X i ⊆ R n is nonempty closed and convex for all
is continuously differentiable and strongly convex in
Let L be the maximum of such Lipschitz constants over i ∈ N[1, N ].
Lipschitz continuity
Theorem 4 (Lipschitz continuity). Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and that for a givenȳ ∈ Y and networkḠ, the operator F (x,ȳ,Ḡ) is a uniform block P-function with constantη, so that the Nash equilibrium x (ȳ,Ḡ) of the game G(ȳ,Ḡ) is unique.
18 Then for any y ∈ Y and any Nash equilibrium x (y,Ḡ) of the perturbed game G(y,Ḡ) it holds
If additionally X is bounded then for any y ∈ Y, any network G and any Nash equilibrium x (y, G) of G(y, G) it holds
where ∆ := max x∈X x 2 .
A similar Lipschitz continuity result for the solution of general VIs was presented in (Dafermos, 1988 , Theorem 2.1) under the assumption of strong monotonicity. Melo (2018) studies Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium in strongly monotone network games. With respect to both of these works, Theorem 4 proves Lipschitz continuity under the weaker uniform block P-function property allowing the analysis of games whose Jacobian is not strongly monotone, e.g. under Assumption 2b) or 2c).
The assumptions needed in Theorem 4 to obtain Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium are fairly general. In the next section we study its differentiability by considering more structured constraint sets and adopting a constraint qualification assumption.
Differentiability
In this section we consider a fixed network and hence omit G in G(y, G), F (x, y, G) and x (y, G). We also assume that the sets X i are polyhedra and satisfy the Slater constraint qualification, as presented next. This allows us to use a KKT reformulation of the VI(X , F ), as recalled in Proposition 4.
Assumption 4 (Polyhedral constraints). The constraint sets can be expressed as
For simplicity, we define B :
Proposition 4 (KKT system for VIs). Suppose Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. The following statements are equivalent:
1. x (y) solves the VI(X , F (·, y));
2. there exists λ(y) ∈ R m and µ(y) ∈ R p such that
The previous proposition is proven in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003 
5b) A has full row rank, 5c) the strict complementarity slackness condition λ k (ȳ) > 0 when B (k,:) x (ȳ) = b k is satisfied.
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Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 5, the Nash equilibrium is locally unique and differentiable, as shown in Facchinei and Pang (2010) and Friesz and Bernstein (2016) . It is important to note that while Lipschitz continuity of the Nash equilibrium can be easily obtained in network games (see Theorem 4), to prove differentiability one needs to rely on Assumption 5a), which is implied by strong monotonicity, and on Assumptions 5b) and 5c) which, on the other hand, depend on the constraint structure and might be difficult to verify a priori. In some special cases however they can be easily checked. For example, if there are only equality constraints both conditions immediately hold. In fact, in the case of equality constraints, if A is not full row rank then there are redundant constraints that can be removed without loss of generality, hence 5b) always hold. Condition 5c) on the other hand involves only inequality constraints and is trivially met if B is the empty matrix.
For the cases when Assumption 5 holds, an explicit formula for the Jacobian of x (y) atȳ is given in (Friesz et al., 1990 , Theorem 1). Such formula involves both the primal and dual variables associated with the solution to VI(X , F (·,ȳ)) and is therefore difficult to interpret in terms of simple primitives of the network game.
20 By considering only the active constraints instead of the whole KKT system, we present here an equivalent formula for ∇ y x (ȳ) that does not depend explicitly on the dual variables. This reformulation allows us to have an immediate understanding of the behavior of the Nash equilibrium for small perturbation of the parameter.
Proposition 5 (Nash equilibrium sensitivity formula). If Assumptions 3, 4 and 5 hold then the Jacobian of x (y) atȳ can be expressed as
and A is as defined in Assumption 5.
Proposition 5 is proven in our companion paper Parise and Ozdaglar (2017) where we additionally show how it can be used to study optimal interventions in networks, along the lines of Ballester et al. (2006); Acemoglu et al. (2015) . We show in Appendix F how Assumption 5 and Proposition 5 simplify in the case of scalar strategies and non-negativity constraints.
To illustrate our findings we apply the previous theory to the race and tournaments model introduced in Example 2.
Example 2 (Continued). We already showed that this game has a symmetric equilibriumx(γ) =x γ 1 N for any value of γ and that this is the unique equilibrium when γ < 1 b (since Assumption 2b is met). Theorem 2 immediately allows us to conclude that for γ < 1 b , the BR dynamics (both continuous and discrete) are globally converging, hence the unique equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable with respect to both continuous and discrete BR dynamics.
In the following we aim at studying how the symmetric equilibrium changes if γ changes. To this end, note that the equilibrium is interior sincex γ ∈ (a, b). Hence the matrix A, as defined in Assumption 5, is empty. Assumption 5b) and 5c) are therefore trivially met. We need to verify Assumption 5a). Recall that
∂x i = 1 and
Hence a sufficient condition for Assumption 5a) to be met is that G is not only row stochastic but also column stochastic, in which case ρ G+G 2 = 1.
Formula (30) then leads to
hence the equilibrium effort is increasing in the network weight γ (note that all the components have the same derivative consistently with the fact that this is a symmetric equilibrium).
When γ > 1 b we have already shown that multiple equilibria might appear. It is interesting to note that for large values of γ Assumption 5a) is not satisfied (hence formula (30) cannot be applied) and ∇ x F (x, γ) {x=x(γ)} has a negative eigenvalue. Recalling thatx(γ) is an interior equilibrium and using formula (26), the continuous BR dynamics can be linearized around the symmetric equilibrium leading to the error dynamicsė(t) = −∇ x F (x(γ), γ)e(t), e(t) := x(t) −x(γ) (see also the proof of Theorem 3). For large γ the matrix ∇ x F (x(γ), γ) has a negative eigenvalue and, in this range,x(γ) is not asymptotically stable (by Lyapunov's method).
21 This result suggests a bifurcation type of behavior where the symmetric equilibrium is asymptotically stable when unique, but is not asymptotically stable for values of γ corresponding to multiple equilibria. An interesting consequence is that the total effort in the stable equilibrium might not be monotone in γ. For instance, the following plot shows that the sum of the aggregate effort in the game with N = 2 agents is increasing in γ in the symmetric equilibrium, but is decreasing in the asymmetric equilibrium. It can be shown by the linearization argument above that for this example the symmetric equilibrium is asymptotically stable until the bifurcation point and after that it is not, while the asymmetric equilibrium is asymptotically stable whenever it exists. Therefore, the total effort in the asymptotically stable equilibrium is first increasing and then decreasing. This is in sharp contrast with the results in and Bramoullé et al. (2014) that show that the total effort at the maximum equilibrium 22 is increasing for games of strategic complements and decreasing for games of strategic substitutes, respectively. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we provide a systematic characterization of the properties of the Nash equilibrium of network games. Our analysis encompass games of strategic complements or substitutes or that feature none of these effects. It applies to games with multidimensional and possibly unbounded strategy sets. Our approach exploits the equivalent characterization of Nash equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities and proceeds in two steps. In the first part of the paper (Section 4), we study how the cost function of the agents and different network properties can be related to properties of the game Jacobian (see summary in Table 2 ). In the second part of the paper (Sections 5 to 7), we study how the properties of the game Jacobian affect existence and uniqueness of equilibria, convergence of discrete and continuous best response dynamics and comparative statics in network games (see summary in Table 1 ). Our analysis allows a more systematic understanding of the relation between assumptions that are typically used in the literature of network games and provides novel conditions that cover new classes of network games.
A. Tools from operator theory, variational inequalities, matrix and spectral theory A.1. Operator properties, existence and uniqueness for VIs and connection with Rosen (1965) We report in the following definition a slightly weaker version of the properties in Definition 2.
b) A block P-function with respect to the partition Consider a VI(X , F ), where X is nonempty, closed and convex and F is continuous. If F satisfies any of the properties in the first line of Figure A .8 then VI(X , F ) admits a unique solution (for any X , X a cartesian product and rectangular X , respectively). If F satisfies any of the properties in the second line of Figure A .8 then VI(X , F ) admits at most a solution (for the same options of X ), see (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Theorem 2.3.3, Proposition 3.5.10) . Note that in the latter case, existence of a solution is not guaranteed. Existence can however be guaranteed in general if X is additionally bounded (Facchinei and Pang, 2003 , Corollary 2.2.5).
In Rosen (1965) existence and uniqueness of the (Nash equilibrium seen as) solution of the VI(X , F ) is shown for X compact and convex under a diagonal strict concavity condition which (for r = 1 as defined therein) coincides with strict monotonicity. This result is consistent with the known results for existence and uniqueness of the VI solution summarised above. Note that, in this sense, our sufficient conditions for strong monotonicity derived in Theorems B.1 and B.3 can be seen as sufficient conditions for the diagonal strict concavity condition employed in Rosen (1965) . By proving strong instead of strict monotonicity we are however able to prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for sets X that are not necessarily bounded (e.g., X i = R n ≥0 ). Finally, the case of uniform block P-functions and uniform P-functions are not considered in Rosen (1965) and allow for the analysis of network games whose operator is not strictly monotone (see Theorems B.2 and B.4).
A.2. Auxiliary lemmas and definitions
Definition A.2 (Vector and matrix norms). Given a vector v ∈ R d and a matrix A ∈ R d×d the following definitions hold
Lemma A.1 (Matrix norms). Given a matrix A ∈ R d×d the following relations between matrix norms hold
Lemma A.2 (Properties of the Kronecker product). Consider any matrices A, B, C, D of suitable dimensions so that the following statements are well-defined. The following properties hold.
Lemma A.3 (Properties symmetric matrices). Consider a symmetric matrix A ∈ R d×d , A = A . The following statements hold
Proof. This fact is known, we report the proof for completeness. Note that clearly d is an eigenvalue of A, hence ρ(A) ≥ d. We conclude the proof by showing ρ(A) ≤ d. Let λ be the eigenvalue that achieves the spectral radius, that is, |λ| = ρ(A) and let v be the corresponding eigenvector. Moreover, let i ∈ N[1, N ] be the index such that
Lemma A.5. Consider the linear quadratic game of Example 1. If there exists
then the game with rescaled coordinatesx i = 1 √ βi
βi , networkG ij = G ij β i β j and admits an exact potential.
Proof. By making the change of coordinates x i = β ix i the cost function can be reformulated as
βi . This game has an exact potential if and only ifK iG ij =K jG ji which is true by assumption.
Remark A.1. The following special cases of Lemma A.5 are discussed in Bramoullé et al. (2014) .
1. If G = G the change of coordinates corresponding to β i = K i leads to a game that is homogeneous (K i = 1) and has a symmetric network.
If there exists {α
, N }, the change of coordinates corresponding to β i = Ki αi leads to a game withK i = α i andG ij = G ij
This is equivalent to a game withK i = 1 and symmetric networkḠ ij = α iGij (sinceḠ ij = α iGij = α i G ij In this section we detail the results of Table 2 . To help with the understanding of the following theorems we consider as benchmark the simple linear quadratic game presented in Example 1. This model belongs to the class of network games that are typically considered in the literature and allow us to easily compare our results. Moreover, we show in the next subsections that, despite its simplicity, a vast range of different strategic interactions can be captured with it by simply tuning the values of the parameters K i (modeling the weight of the neighbor aggregate on each agent i).
B.1. A condition in terms of G 2
As discussed in Section 4 the strongest result is obtained under Assumption 2a, which depends on G 2 . In this case, both strong monotonicity and the P Υ condition hold.
Theorem B.1 (Strong monotonicity and P Υ condition under Assumption 2a). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2a hold. Then the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) 1. is strongly monotone with constant α 2 , 2. satisfies the P Υ condition.
For cases when Assumption 2a is not satisfied (see Section 4), we develop in the following subsections alternative guarantees in terms of Assumptions 2b and 2c.
B.2. A condition in terms of G ∞
As detailed in Section 4.1.1, Assumption 2b is useful for asymmetric networks where each agent is influenced by a relatively small number of agents (i.e., G ∞ is small). The next theorem shows that this is sufficient to prove the P Υ condition.
Theorem B.2 (P Υ condition under Assumption 2b). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2b hold. Then the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) satisfies the P Υ condition.
On the other hand, under Assumption 2b, it is not possible to guarantee strong monotonicity. An illustrative example is given next.
Example B.1 (Assumption 2b: P Υ but not strongly monotone). Consider the linear quadratic game in Example 1 with N = 6 players over an asymmetric star as in Figure 3d ) and 15 0 has a negative eigenvalue. Hence F is not monotone. This is consistent with the fact that α 2 = 1 − 0.9 · √ 5 < 0, hence Assumption 2a is violated. Following the discussion in Section 4.2.1, we note that Assumption 2b does not guarantee strong monotonicity because it provides a bound on G ∞ but not on G 1 . In this example for instance G 1 = N − 1 G ∞ = 1.
B.3. Conditions in terms of |λ min (G)|
Finally, we consider Assumption 2c which is formulated in terms of |λ min (G)| and therefore can be applied only to symmetric networks, for which |λ min (G)| is well defined. 23 We recall that for symmetric networks Assumption 2c is the least restrictive condition (see Section 4.1.2 and Figure 4) . Because of such generality, Assumption 2c alone is not sufficient to guarantee any of the properties in Definition 2, as illustrated in the next example. In this subsection, we derive additional conditions to complement Assumption 2c and guarantee that at least one of the properties in Definition 2 is satisfied. 
From Proposition 1, a vector x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it solves the VI(X , F ). This is equivalent to the requirement
see (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 1.5.8) . In this example
Consequently, any vector x = β1 N with β ≥ 0 solves the fixed point equation (B.1) and this game has infinitely many Nash equilibria. None of the properties in Definition 2 can therefore hold (recall that they all imply uniqueness by Proposition 2). This example does not contradict Theorem B.1, since
hence Assumption 2a is violated. We finally note that, since K i < 0 for all i, this is a game of strategic complements.
The previous example proves that Assumption 2c is not enough to guarantee uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in games of strategic complements. We show in the following that Assumption 2c is instead sufficient for games of strategic substitutes. The intuition for this discrepancy is that for games with the simple structure in Example 1, the properties in Definition 2 are related to the minimum eigenvalue of I + KG (i.e., ∇ x F (x)) being positive. For simplicity consider the homogeneous weight case where K i = κ for all i so that K = κI N . It is then clear that if κ > 0 (substitutes case), the minimum eigenvalue of I + κG is related to the λ min (G) hence Assumption 2c suffices, while if κ < 0 (complements case) the minimum eigenvalue of I + κG is related to λ max (G) hence the stronger Assumption 2a is needed. This argument is made rigorous and generalized to nonlinear and multidimensional network games in the following theorems.
Theorem B.3 (Strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2c hold. Moreover, assume that
Then the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) is strongly monotone with constant α min .
23 Even if |λ min (G)| was well defined for an asymmetric network, Theorem B.3 and Theorem B.4 would still not apply.
In Theorem B.3, we guarantee strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c instead of Assumption 2a by additionally assuming that 1) the neighbor aggregate z i affects the cost of each agent in the same way (i.e., 
hence all the assumptions of Theorem B.3 are satisfied and F is strongly monotone. Nonetheless, the matrix Υ in (11) is equal to I 10 − 0.5G c and has minimum eigenvalue λ min (Υ) = 1 − 0.5λ max (G c ) = 1 − 0.5 · 9 < 0. Hence Υ is not a P-matrix (all the real eigenvalues of a P-matrix are positive as shown in (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 3.3) ). Condition P Υ is thus violated. Intuitively this happens because the condition P Υ is agnostic to the sign of the K i s (since κ i,j = |K i |G ij ) and is therefore overly conservative for cases when the K i are positive (substitute). Note that (for scalar games) this is not the case for the uniform P matrix condition in Definition D.1. By Lemma D.1 this condition is satisfied if there exists H diagonal and positive definite such that H(I 10 + 0.5G c ) + (I 10 + 0.5G c )H 0. This is clearly the case for H = I 10 since I 10 + 0.5G c 0. Note that the uniform P matrix condition accounts for the fact that the K i are positive (i.e., depends on I 10 + 0.5G c instead of I 10 − 0.5G c ).
Both conditions in Theorem B.3 are needed to guarantee strong monotonicity. In fact, Example B.2 shows that if condition 1) holds but condition 2) does not, then F might not be strongly monotone. The next example shows that the same is true if condition 2) holds but condition 1) does not, that is, if we consider a game of strategic substitutes with heterogeneous weights.
Example B.4 (Assumption 2c: Uniform P-function not strongly monotone, not P Υ ). Consider the linear quadratic game in Example 1, with N = 10, K i = 0.1 > 0 for all i ∈ Z[1, 9], K 10 = 0.9 > 0 and G = G c . Then , 9] . One can verify that the following quantity
is negative, hence F is not strongly monotone (it is not even monotone). The reason why with heterogeneous weights, strong monotonicity may fail is that in this case the matrix K is diagonal but not scalar. Consequently, even though K i > 0 for all i it might happen that
Consequently, one cannot use Assumption 2c to lower bound the left hand side of (B.3) by a positive quantity (i.e., α min ), which is what would be needed to prove that F is strongly monotone. The P Υ condition is not satisfied either because in this example Υ = I − KG c and λ min (Υ) < 0, hence Υ is not a P-matrix. By choosing H = K −1 it is instead easy to show that H(I + KG c ) + (I + G c K)H = 2K −1 + 2G c 0. It follows from Lemma D.1 and Proposition 3c) that the uniform P-matrix condition holds and F is a uniform P-function. Again note that the difference between the P Υ and the uniform P-matrix condition reduces in this simple case to the difference between I − KG c and I + KG c .
In the previous example, the operator is not strongly monotone nor satisfies the P Υ condition. Nonetheless, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium can still be guaranteed since F is a uniform P-function. We next prove that for scalar games (i.e., when n = 1) this is true in general, as long as the K i (x) are positive.
Theorem B.4 (Uniform P-matrix condition for scalar games of strategic substitutes). Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2c hold and that n = 1. Then 1. if there exists ν > 0 such that K i (x) ≥ ν for all i ∈ N[1, N ] and all x ∈ X then ∇ x F (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition and the game Jacobian F as defined in (10) is a uniform P-function;
is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X and F (x) is a P-function. 
where we used the fact that for symmetric matrices all eigenvalues are real, the spectral radius equals the 2-norm (see Lemma A.3), the triangular inequality, the fact that for any matrix A it holds A 2 = A 2 and W 2 = G ⊗ I n 2 = G 2 (see Lemma A.2). Moreover, note that
since the norm of a block diagonal matrix equals the largest norm of its blocks. Using the last result we can immediately see that
Since by Assumption 2a α 2 > 0, equation (C.3) implies that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant α 2 .
2. For network games the matrix Υ in Definition 5 can be rewritten equivalently with the notation in (14) as
Let us define M := κ 1 I N − κ 2 G ∈ R N ×N and note that under Assumption 2a
0 and for any w = 0 it holds w
and M is a P-matrix. Since both Υ and M are Z-matrices (i.e., all the elements outside the diagonal are non-positive) and Υ is greater or equal than M element-wise, the fact that M is a P-matrix implies that Υ is a P-matrix (Fiedler and Ptak, 1962, Theorem 4.2) . Therefore the P Υ condition holds.
Proof of Theorem B.2: P Υ condition under Assumption 2b
Consider the matrix M := κ 1 I N − κ 2 G ∈ R N ×N as defined in the proof of Theorem B.1 part 2. Note that for each i it holds j =i |M ij | ≤ κ 2 G ∞ . By Gershgorin theorem all the eigenvalues of M are therefore contained in a circle of radius κ 2 G ∞ centered in (κ 1 , 0). Since κ 1 − κ 2 G ∞ > 0 all the eigenvalues of M have positive real part. The same argument can be applied to any principal sub-matrix of M to conclude that all its eigenvalues have positive real part. This is a sufficient condition for M to be a P-matrix. The conclusion follows as in Theorem B.1 part 2.
Proof of Theorem B.3: Strong monotonicity under Assumption 2c
The proof of this statement is similar to the proof of Theorem B.1 part 1. The only difference is the bound on λ min
. Note that under Assumption 2c the matrix G is symmetric. It follows
. By the properties of the Kronecker product,
where we used the fact that the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product are the product of the eigenvalues, all the eigenvalues ofK(x) +K(x) are non-negative, Lemmas A.2 and A.3) . Combining this new bound with (C.2) we get
Hence from (C.1) we get
Since by Assumption 2c α min > 0, equation (C.4) implies that F (x) is strongly monotone with constant α min .
Proof of Theorem B.4: Uniform P-matrix condition for scalar games of strategic substitutes
To prove the first statement we prove that ∇ x F (x) ∈ R N ×N satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition. The fact that F is a uniform P-function then follows from Proposition 3c). Let us consider any set of N vectors {x [h] ∈ X } N h=1 , and the corresponding matrix
Because of formula (12) and since n = 1 we get
. . .
Note that since n = 1 for all
) are positive numbers. In particular,
is well defined, diagonal and positive definite. Overall, we get
Note that H x A x is symmetric, therefore we can use Lemma A.3 and conclude that
It follows that if for any w ∈ R N we set H x,w = H x , it holds w H x,w A x w = w H x A x w ≥ η w 2 2 . Moreover, by Assumption 2c we have that η = αmin κ2 > 0 (recall λ min (G) < 0 as by Lemma 1). Finally note that for any fixed set of vectors
To prove the second statement we note that following similar arguments it is possible to prove that ∇ x F (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X . Since n = 1, X is a rectangle and the conclusion that F (x) is a P-function follows by (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9 (a) ).
D. A novel sufficient condition for uniform P-functions
Definition D.1 (Uniform P-matrix condition). Given a matrix valued function x → A(x) ∈ R d×d , we say that A(x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition over X if there exists η > 0 such that for all sets of d vectors {x [h] ∈ X } d h=1 and for any w ∈ R d there exists a diagonal matrix H x,w 0 such that it holds w H x,w A x w ≥ η w 2 2 , where
Remark D.1. The uniform P-matrix condition in Definition D.1 might seem complicated at first sight. This is a slightly stronger condition than requiring that: "A(x) is a P-matrix for all x" (we refer to this condition as 6'). If A(x) = ∇ x F (x) satisfies 6' instead of 6, one can guarantee that F is a P-function, as by Definition A.1 in Appendix A, but not necessarily that F is a uniform P-function. Consequently, condition 6' is not sufficient to guarantee existence of a VI solution (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.10) . To obtain Definition D.1 from 6', we strengthen the requirement that A(x) is a P-matrix for all x (or equivalently that for any x, w = 0 there exists H x,w such that w H x,w A(x)w > 0) in two ways. First, we require a uniform curvature bound (i.e., we require w H x,w A(x)w ≥ η w 2 2 instead of w H x,w A(x)w > 0). Second, we require that this condition holds not only for all possible A(x) matrices but also for all matrices A x obtained by selecting each row from a different matrix in the set {A(
. The technical reason for this is that in the proof of Proposition 3c) we need to apply the mean value theorem to each row separately. 24 We also note that for the case n = 1, Definition D.1 is different from Definition 5 (see Example B.4). Consequently, parts b) and c) of Proposition 3 provide different sufficient conditions even for the case n = 1.
For gradients of affine operators, an equivalent but simpler condition for Definition D.1 is given next.
Lemma D.1. Consider an operator F (x) = Ax + a where A ∈ R d×d , a ∈ R d . Then ∇ x F (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition if and only if there exists η > 0 such that for any w ∈ R d there exists a diagonal matrix H w 0 such that w H w Aw ≥ η w 2 and max w λ max (H w ) < ∞. More simply, ∇ x F (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition if there exists a diagonal matrix H 0 such that HA + A H 0.
Proof. For affine operators ∇ x F (x) = A is a matrix independent of x. Consequently,
. Hence the uniform P-matrix condition is satisfied if there exists η > 0 such that for any w ∈ R d there exists a diagonal matrix H w 0 such that w H w Aw ≥ η w 2 . Here max
max w λ max (H w,x ) = max w λ max (H w ). Note that if there exists a diagonal matrix H 0 such that HA + A H 0, then the previous statement holds with H w = H for all w ∈ R d , η := 1 2 λ min (HA + A H) > 0 and λ max (H) < ∞. For the affine case, condition 6' in Remark D.1 requires A to be a P-matrix. Equivalently, F (x) = Ax + a is a P-function if for any w = 0 there exists a diagonal matrix H w 0 such that w H w Aw > 0. The only difference in Lemma D.1 is that it requires a uniformity condition on the eigenvalues of the H w .
We next report the proof of Proposition 3c) and some comparison with previous literature results. We start with the auxiliary Lemma D.2. Theorem D.1 proves Proposition 3c).
Lemma D.2. Consider a matrix A x ∈ R d×d and suppose that there exists η > 0 such that for all w ∈ R d there exists a diagonal matrix H x,w 0 such that it holds w H x,w A x w ≥ η w where M x := max w λ max (H x,w ).
Proof. By contradiction suppose that it is not true. That is, there exists w ∈ R
Since this holds for all x, y we get that F is a uniform P-function with constant η dM > 0.
Note that in (Facchinei and Pang, 2003, Proposition 3.5.9(a) ) it is shown that if ∇ x F (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X then F is a P-function (according to Definition A.1). Lemma D.1 above shows that by substituting the condition "∇ x F (x) is a P-matrix for all x ∈ X " with "∇ x F (x) satisfies the uniform P-matrix condition" one can get that F is a uniform P-function which is stronger than F being a P-function (see Figure A.8) .
In this work, we need the uniformity property to prove existence of the VI solution without imposing that the set X is bounded. 
Proof. For simplicity set β i := B i (z i (x)) := arg min y i ∈X i J i (y i , z i (x)). Then it holds
, wherex i = (1 − t)x i + tβ i for some t ∈ [0, 1] by the mean value theorem. Hence
Lemma E.2 (Convergence in potential games). Consider a potential game satisfying Assumption 1 and with strongly convex potential U (x). Then the continuous BR dynamics (Algorithm 1) and the discrete sequential BR dynamics (Algorithm 2 for T i = N (N−1)+i) globally converge to the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. This is a well known result, see e.g. Monderer and Shapley (1996) and (Sandholm, 2010, Theorem 7.1.3 ). The proof is reported for completeness. For continuous BR dynamics consider L(x) := U (x) − U (x ) as Lyapunov function. Note that L(x) ≥ 0 for all x and L(x) = 0 if and only if x = x , since the Nash equilibrium is the unique minimizer of U (x). Moreover,L(x(t)) = ∇ x U (x(t)) ẋ(t) = F (x(t)) d(x(t)) ≤ −κ 1 d(x(t)) 
Following the same arguments of (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1997, Proposition 3.9) it is possible to show that every limit point of {x k } ∞ k=1 minimizes U (x). Since U (x) is strongly convex there is a unique minimizer which is the Nash equilibrium. Hence all limit points of {x k } ∞ k=1 coincide and equal the Nash equilibrium. We can conclude that x k → x . 
Proof of Lemma 2
This fact coincides with (Fukushima, 1992 , Proposition 4.1) upon noticing that B(x) = arg min y∈X F (x) (y− x) + locally Π X i [x i − F i (x)] = x i − F i (x). The dynamics of these agents (which we collectively index by I) arė x I (t) = −F I (x I , x −I ) and the linearized error dynamics areė I (t) = −[∇ x F (x )] I,I e I (t). Similar arguments can be applied to prove that all eigenvalues of −[∇ x F (x )] I,I are negative since [∇ x F (x )] I,I is a principal submatrix of a P-matrix.
E.1. Additional examples
Example E.1 (Discrete BR dynamics under strong monotonicity). A) Consider the game in Example 1 with N = 4, K i = 0.5, G = G c and a i = 1. We have already shown in Example B.3 that the game Jacobian is strongly monotone and Assumption 2c is met. It is also easy to see that this game is potential since
Figure E.9A) shows that the simultaneous discrete BR dynamics do not converge. The fact that the game is potential instead guarantees that both the continuous and discrete sequential BR dynamics converge. B) We next show that if we remove the potential structure this result is not guaranteed anymore. To this end, consider the exact same example but assume K 1 = −1.5 instead of K 1 = 0.5. Note that the game is not potential anymore because K 1 G 1j = −1.5 = 0.5 = K j G j1 .
Nonetheless, by numerical computation of the eigenvalues of ∇ x F (x) + ∇ x F (x) one can verify that F (x) is strongly monotone. Example E.2 (Strong monotonicity does not imply block-contraction). Consider the game in Example E.1A) with X i = R for simplicity. We have already shown therein that the game Jacobian where for any x ∈ X we setz i (x) := N j=1Ḡ ij x j and z i (x) := N j=1 G ij x j .
The case of scalar non-negativity constraints In the case of scalar strategies and non-negativity constraints, Assumption 5 and Proposition 5 can be simplified. First of all, for any game G(y) let us call active any agent i ∈ N[1, N ] for which x i (y) > 0 and inactive any agent for which x i (y) = 0. Let A be the set of active players atȳ. Since only non-negativity constraints are present B = −I N , b = 0 and H, h are empty. This simplifies Assumption 5. Specifically, since A is obtained by selecting only rows from B = −I N Assumption 5b) always holds. If we write the KKT conditions for these constraints we have Hence from (F.2a) we get that the dual variable λ i (y) associated with the constraint that the strategy of agent i should be non-negative is λ i (y) = ∇ x i J i (x i (y), z i (x (y)), y i ). The strict complementarity condition in Assumption 5c) is then equivalent to the requirement that
When Assumption 5 holds, for any small perturbation of y aroundȳ the set of active players does not change. This means that in a neighborhood ofȳ we can equivalently consider a reduced game G A (y) where we remove all the players that are inactive atȳ. Let G A be the adjacency matrix obtained by deleting from G all the rows and columns with indices not in A. Any Nash equilibrium of the reduced game G A (y), complemented with x i (y) = 0 for all i / ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the full game G(y). Consequently, the vector of sensitivities can be computed applying formula (30) to the reduced game (for which there are no active constraints) resulting in
where A c denotes the set of inactive players atȳ. This result allows for example to derive (Allouch, 2015 , Proposition 1).
